

Issues, and Solutions, to Providing Formal Privacy for ACS



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Outline



- Differential Privacy for ACS harder than Decennial
 - Higher Dimensionality
 - *Several known approaches to mitigate impact of Differential Privacy for high dimensionality, e.g., [[Qardaji14](#),[McKenna18](#)]*
 - Stratified survey rather than enumeration
- Solutions - Smooth sensitivity for:
 - Missing data imputation
 - Post-stratification
- Other Challenges

ACS Challenges



- Considerable variance in response quality and rates across different groups
 - Geographic
 - Demographic
- Statistical methods used to reduce bias and variance
 - Stratified sampling
 - Missing data imputation
 - Weighting approaches

These make differential privacy more challenging

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ACS Challenges



- Differential privacy based on hiding the impact of any single individual on a published value
- Statistical methods used to reduce bias and variance
 - *These can impact how much one response influences an estimate!*
- Simple example: Weighting
 - Samples with high weights have greater impact on outcomes
 - For a count, one person changes result by at most 1
 - *But for an estimate from a weighted sample, one person can change the value by their weight, so must add noise to cover highest possible weight*

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These problems are solvable!



- Formal privacy techniques to reduce bias given biased samples

- Missing data imputation
- Post-stratification

We've developed approaches that address each of these

Real-world DP: What is the Sensitivity?



- Sensitivity: Maximum change in query/statistic from adding or deleting one individual
- Examples of sensitivity
 - Count (e.g., how many high income individuals in this room): 1
 - Average (e.g., average income in this room):


$$\frac{\sum_{all} income}{n} - \frac{\sum_{all+1} income}{n} \leq \frac{\text{Maximum income}}{\text{Number of individuals}}$$

Minimum possible
maximum possible

Problem: Missing Data *And does this impact privacy?*



- Assignment
 - Missing value determined from other characteristics of individual
 - Assuming rules not derived from other records, no impact on sensitivity
- Allocation
 - Copy values from similar “donor” individual
 - *Increases Sensitivity!*




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Global Sensitivity High



- Can construct situations where changing one individual dramatically changes result
- Global Sensitivity of count query \approx size of dataset
 - Any mechanism based on global sensitivity will have untenably high variance.




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Solutions



- Ignore missing data
 - No impact on sensitivity → low variance solution
 - But biased result
 - Data frequently not missing completely at random
- Low sensitivity allocation method?
 - Will this effectively reduce bias?
- *Smooth Sensitivity*



Smooth Sensitivity (Nissim, Raskhodnikova & Smith STOC'07)




- Idea: Neighbors of current database don't induce big changes
 - Local sensitivity low
- Pathological datasets far away from the real dataset have substantially less impact on privacy.
- Sensitivity based on distance from actual data
 - For $\beta > 0$, the β -smooth sensitivity of f is

$$S_{f,\beta}^*(x) = \max_{y \in D^n} (LS_f(y) \cdot e^{-\beta d(x,y)})$$

Problem statement



- (Deterministic) Nearest neighbor
- Determine upper bound on local sensitivity of function on data and allocated values
- Solutions for count, mean, variance
 - *Technical details in a paper under review*



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

Evaluation Testbed



- Idea: *Model* missing data based on ACS Public Use Microdata
 - We know what was missing
 - Use to build model of what makes data missing
- Apply model to 1940 Census Data
 - Complete dataset (no weighted sample issues)
 - Known ground truth

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
1940 Mean Individual Income Ages 20-59




Proportion of Individuals unable to support Family of 4 Above Poverty Line



Ages 20-29




Ages 40-49



Post-Stratification



- Idea: Determine stratification based on known statistics
 - Number of francophones in Fredericton
- Weight francophones in sample so results match known values
 - Improves correlated survey results for which values unknown (e.g., if occupation varies by language)
- *Global Sensitivity off the charts!*
 - Hypothetical survey that only captures one francophone – represents ~4000 individuals




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Challenge with Limiting Post-Stratification Weight



- Known: Count of Circles, Squares
 - Limit maximum weight to 4
 - 20 known squares, 4 in sample – weight exceeds limit
 - Weight based on total count only: $40 / 20$ in sample = 2
- Query: Number of blue
 - One in sample
 - One individual represents 2, so query results = 2
- Neighboring Database: Additional blue square in sample
 - 5 squares in sample, so weight = 4
- Number of blue = $2 * 4 = 8$
 - Sensitivity $8-2 = 6!$



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Solution: Stochastic Post-Stratification

(with Aref Dajani, Stephen Clark, Rolando Rodriguez-Rivera, U.S. Census Bureau)



- Select post-stratification binning P for dataset D
- Balance maximum weight and fine granularity
 - $f(D, P) = \frac{|P|}{W_0^P(D)}$
- Choose among possible P with probability $e^{\epsilon f(D, P)}$
 - Differentially private selection avoids one individual having too great an impact on how post-stratification done
- *Currently running experiments to evaluate bias reduction / variance tradeoff*

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Conclusions



- Formal Privacy for ACS is challenging
 - But solvable
- Requires new techniques, which could be
 - New approaches to differential privacy
 - New techniques for bias/variance reduction that are more amenable to formal privacy
 - New formal privacy definitions and methods
- *The research community is making advances on all of these*

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